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Anthony R. Zito 
Environmental Policy and Governance: Bringing the State Back In (Again)?  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This contribution follows Capano et al. (2013), arguing that the study of governance 
both requires a multi-variable explanation and an awareness that governing in the current age 
has not abandoned the issues and mechanisms of government. The chapter explores the utility 
of a fourfold governance framework that explores structural, ideational and instrumental 
levels of political interaction. To empirically challenge the framework, the contribution 
studies the environmental policy sector. It investigates whether new forms of state-society 
networks (and the policy styles that they encompass) and new policy instruments are 
transforming traditional state arrangements, or whether national institutions continue to shape 
path dependent dynamics of how actors behave and how instruments operate.  Do federal (as 
opposed to unitary) structures, the orientation of the legal/constitutional structure and the 
national political economic structures continue to limit the direction and nature of 
governance? 
The contribution asks whether the governance-related developments in four OECD 
countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, and The Netherlands) follow any particular pattern of 
convergence.  In examining the governance arrangements, the paper explores the balance and 
relationship between both public and private actors, and how innovations in instruments may 
have affected this balance. The sample of countries focuses on three federal systems and one 
unitary system. Special attention is given to the European Union’s (EU’s) role in shaping the 
governing processes in the two EU member states.  The paper uses a mixture of interviews 
for the Netherlands, Australia and Canada (interviewing over 60 mid-level policy officials in 
both state and society spheres as well as academic and non-academic policy experts), 
government documents and secondary sources to highlight the nature of environmental 
policy-making across multiple levels of analysis. 
 
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
In order to analyse the movement towards governance, we need to define several dimensions. 
The first dimension is the degree to which the political system has moved towards some 
semblance of a governance position, i.e. a move from more traditional, top-down governing 
procedures (for the sake of simplicity, labelled ‘government’) towards a large scale 
integration of vertical and horizontal actors in the steering process (Marinetto 2003). The 
general literature expects such a move in the governance scenario: ‘political analysts have all 
come to perceive governance as a departure from traditional, state-centred styles of 
governing’ (Palumbo 2010, xiv).   In making this proposition, one must acknowledge the 
longstanding question as to whether traditional forms of governing actually did lack such 
involvement of multiple layers and civil society: are the more flexible governance 
arrangements all that ‘new’? By looking at our four political systems over time, hopefully we 
will be able to get some sense of this reality.   
There is a second objection, namely that the concept of governance as differentiated 
by Hooghe and Marks and others, are actually ideal types. A number of legal scholars have 
argued that processes and tools of governance may cohabit the same policy space as more 
traditional processes and tools of government – the concept of hybridity (Burca and Scott 
2006; Trubek et al. 2006; Trubek and Trubek 2007). The conjunction of such dynamics and 
tools may create conflicts but also may operate relatively harmoniously. Although scholars 
may pose polar opposites on the governance continuum, it is actually much more likely that 
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most systems have some hybrid arrangement that moves them away from such poles. There 
are two possible hypotheses that may explain this hybridity. First, the empirical examinations 
for governance have tended to assess these poles during the period of transition between a 
government-oriented policy system and a governance-oriented system. Such a transitional 
period may simply take time and be ongoing at the point of observation.  The second 
possibility is that the process of governing is likely over time to combine both governance 
and government elements: hybridity is the permanent reality (Capano et al. 2012).   
The second important set of dimensions concerns the elements of governance. Treib, 
Bahr and Falkner (2007) postulated that an integrated theory of governance involves three 
dimensions of governance that need to be studied simultaneously to get a full sense of how 
governance works.  As these elements interact, Treib et al. suggest the essential need for a 
multiple dimension framework.  Combining the multi-dimensional approach with the 
concerns about hybridity, Howlett et al. (2009) and Capano et al. (2013) warn against the 
typical governance literature assumption that new governance arrangements will move at a 
clear, even pace away from the traditional government configuration. The multivariate 
framework lends itself to the hypothesis that policy normally tends towards more mixed 
arrangements.  Such a system should allow scholars to tease out the location of hybrid 
relationships and more carefully study the conjuncture of both ‘new’ governance and 
traditional government models, such as hierarchical instruments operating with other more 
flexible instruments in less hierarchical situations (Howlett et al. 2009).  
One ambiguity in this recent multi-dimensional analysis of governance is the relative 
importance of each dimension, as well as the degree to which they shape each other. This 
paper turns to Hall’s influential conceptualization of the policy process with its combined 
focus on the nature of the state, how the state relates to society, the role of transformative 
ideas and the actual policy content (Hall 1993: 276-278). Hall’s (1993) argument defines 
several core elements of state policy-making: governmental administrative structures and 
procedural arrangements; the policy style of the sector, which encapsulates how state actors 
engage with other relevant actors; and policy content involving: (1) the policy goals, which 
will be centred on a framework of ideas that explain their position and the means to 
implement the goal; (2) the instruments for achieving the policy aims; and (3) the precise 
instrument calibration.  Adapting this framework should allow us to discern the scale at 
which different governance processes may operate. 
The article uses four overarching categories to encapsulate Hall’s 1993 notions (see 
Table One). The idea of formal institutional structures and more permanent yet often informal 
state-society relations are represented by the first category, governing structures.  Within this 
first category, are the characteristics that are likely (but not necessarily) to be more formal, 
namely:  the institutional rules set out in national constitutions (and, for EU member states, 
the EU Treaties), and the processes and norms of the policy-making institutions. The 
governing structures also include the formal and informal structures that define the nature of 
the key relationships between the public actors and the societal/civil society actors. The 
governance approach would predict that decision-making would be diffused away from the 
national government actors in their effort to maintain control and direct interests towards a 
greater vertical scope for supranational and international bodies and sub-national actors and a 
horizontal diffusion of power away from traditional, centralised (i.e. state) mechanisms of 
authority. 
 
Table 1 Government versus Governance Framework (adapted from Hall 2003) 
Category Specification Government pole Governance pole 
Governing structures Formal institutional Authority is Authority is diffused 
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rules and processes centralized within a 
limited group of 
actors who prescribe 
rules and resources, 
normally in 
hierarchical positions 
within national 
governments. 
over a wider range of 
actors, in a less 
hierarchical setting. 
 Likely to be less 
formal but permanent 
interactions between 
state/society actors. 
These relationships 
may involve rules 
and principles that 
have wider 
application than the 
specific problem. 
State actors/rules 
tend to define the 
scope of access and 
the exchange of 
resources. They steer 
the course of the 
interaction; more 
hierarchical 
dynamics. 
A wider range of 
actors in the global 
and national society 
are involved in the 
interaction; they 
define their own 
input and even steer. 
Governing Frames Assessing the policy 
problem 
Centralized, limited 
number of elite tends 
to define the 
problems. 
Broader societal 
input defines the 
problem. 
 Resolving the policy 
problem 
Centralized, limited 
political actors tend 
to steer the outcomes, 
delegate the duties. 
Wider range of actors 
negotiates response, 
delegates roles. 
Governing goals Development of a 
strategy of more 
specific responses, 
within a time frame, 
to tackle the framed 
problem; may 
involve specific 
policy principles. 
Centralised state 
actors define the 
strategy and system, 
make changes to 
goals; top-down and 
hierarchical. 
Wider set of actors 
and interactions, 
reflecting wider 
societal capabilities 
set the strategy and 
governing system, 
make changes to 
goals; more bottom 
up. 
Governing 
Instruments 
Instrument type Command and 
control instruments 
are typical, backed 
by state sanctions.  
 
Wider range of tools 
that involve societal 
actors in a more 
equal role, with 
targets negotiated by 
all the stakeholders. 
 Instrument 
Calibration 
The prescription of 
instruments is precise 
and detailed. 
The instrumental 
steering tends to be 
looser, more flexible.  
 
Hall’s original 1993 article gives a considerable prominence to the role of ideas and 
learning; ideational paradigms have the ability to encompass all of the elements of the policy 
process. This chapter however integrates ideas more concretely into this governance 
framework, with a focus on how ideas shape particular policy responses within a policy 
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sector – more of a mid-range concept than Hall uses. As such, the framework places policy 
ideas on a lower part of the scale than constitutional and institutional structures. The paper 
relies on the policy framing concept (Schön and Rein 2004; Snow and Benford 1988). Policy 
actors (a) confront a situation where their policy understanding is problematic; (b) create an 
understanding or story that helps make analytical sense of the policy situation, and (c) then 
act and persuade others to act upon the frame (Zito 2011). For a governing frame to be more 
oriented towards the governmental pole, the expectation is that public actors and essential 
experts should be the main group who both steer the framing process and shape the 
perspectives of wider society concerning the policy problem. A governance-orientated policy 
frame should see a greater role for a wide range of actors and the need to build consensus in 
the framing of the policy problem and the policy response. 
This contribution privileges the role of policy goals, which forms a subset of Hall’s 
(1993) concept of policy content. Governing goals are the overarching policy responses to a 
particular policy frame, involving a determination about the range of targets, time frames and 
policy instruments to be deployed. These responses form a system of policies to achieve the 
goals of the policy framing. The hierarchy of goals articulated in such a strategy are more 
likely to be stable over time than the constituent instruments and their specifications. The 
government versus governance dichotomization centres partly on the question of the degree 
of prescription embedded in the policies to be undertaken.  It also assesses how top-down and 
inclusive is the system/strategy, as well its monitoring, review and assessment processes.   
The last governing category focuses upon policy instruments and their calibration in 
specific contexts. Governing instruments constitute the variety of tools and techniques that 
policy-makers deploy to implement policy goals (de Bruijn and Hufen 1998; Hood 1983). 
The government hypothesis would expect policy instruments to take the form of regulation 
and other command and control devices (for example hazardous waste legislation should 
have a high degree of prescription). Governance predictions expect a greater role for more 
non-regulatory policy instruments. According to the governance literature, these instruments 
might be proposed, designed and implemented by some grouping of public and private actors, 
or even adopted just amongst the societal actors (Jordan et al. 2005).  Examples of 
governance instruments include voluntary consumer labels agreed within an industry; they 
engage the consumer in the role of making choices. Nevertheless, the outward appearance 
and design of the instrument may not reflect how the actual implementation occurs in 
practice. Accordingly, command and control instruments may be calibrated to have strong 
flexible and inclusive elements (an example is the EU use of framework directives) while 
more supposedly flexible instruments can be strict in their steering of society. Tradable 
permit schemes are a prime example of an instrument which could be quite strict or 
hierarchical or loose and flexible depending on its calibration (which may explain its 
attractiveness to such a range of different actors). 
Table One summarizes the policy elements and the characteristics that government 
and governance ideal types would expect. In order to utilize this framework, some 
consideration has to be given to how these elements interact and shape each other. One 
question is the direction of influence; this paper notes some of the possibilities as 
propositions to test empirically. Hall (1993) takes a rather explicit top-down stance: 
ideational, institutional change drives the more micro elements of public policy change.  
However, Majone’s (1994) work suggests that instruments can define the nature of a state 
and macro institutional innovation – e.g. EU instruments helped to define its nature as a 
regulatory state. A classic example of this was the creation of strict command and control 
regime targeting particular environmental policy problems long before the European 
Communities included environmental policy as an explicit treaty priority. The instruments to 
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some extent preceded the explicit governing structure. This contribution expects that it is 
more likely that change in the more macro structural and ideational broader policy elements 
will re-define the more micro policy elements; nevertheless, the reverse dynamic is possible.  
Another noteworthy dynamic is the degree to which any one framework element or 
combination signifies the dominance of government versus governance characteristics. As 
Table One indicates, the paper views government and governance poles as ideal types 
operating on a continuum; it expects that few environmental policy sectors will clearly fit at 
either pole in terms of policy formulation and implementation. This chapter does not assume 
that a strong orientation towards governance in the one element necessarily means that the 
other categories follow suit.  The approach taken here is that the presence of both government 
and governance elements may be essential to explain how society is steered and that the 
presence of this dimension at any level of analysis is significant in its own right.  In the 
environmental arena, we see various more voluntary agreements established that bear a 
strong stamp of a governance approach; nevertheless it is often the case that these instruments 
exist and are used by societal actors because of the threat of regulation or the need to adhere 
to specific pieces of regulation.  Scharpf’s idea of the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (i.e. voluntary 
co-operation with public objectives is ensured by overarching authority or the threat of 
sanctions) articulates this scenario (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008). The presence and even 
dominance of governance dynamics in a policy area may still be essentially defined and 
underpinned by governmental, top-down dynamics. 
 
COMPARATIVE COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
Before exploring the four countries, it is worth noting the hugely significant role that the EU 
plays in Germany and The Netherlands.  Increasingly the EU defines much of the 
environmental policy goals and specific instruments; it also can put restrictions on the use of 
instruments (for example, due to concerns about implicit trade barriers or unfair 
competitiveness advantages within the member states).  Therefore, the EU’s institutional 
system, grounded in the EU treaties, is a very meaningful arena for policy and civil society 
engagement in Germany and The Netherlands.  The complex institutional chain involved in 
the decision-making process and the lack of a substantial budget means that the EU has a 
fairly open policy style, but one that tends to be reactive due to the difficulty of getting policy 
decided (Weale 1996).  Decision-making also has favours executive actors (member state and 
Commission representatives) and informed interest groups, creating its own centralising 
dynamic. 
The lack of a budget and the imperative of protecting the Single Market have also 
tended to make the regulatory instrument the dominant weapon (Majone 1994).  The EU, in 
response to international climate change commitments, has developed one major instrumental 
innovation, namely the emissions trading scheme. Entering into force at the same time as the 
Kyoto Protocol, the scheme has triggered a substantial realignment in how both the EU and 
the national governments steer climate policy (Wurzel et al. 2013; Wurzel 2008). 
 
Australia 
Structures 
Given the geopolitical challenges of managing a vast territory with considerable ecological 
demands, the orientation of the Australian state has historically focused on building 
infrastructure and the larger nation.  This has built legitimacy for strong state intervention 
that one can see in the ecological politics of The Netherlands.  As a three-tiered political 
federal system, the Commonwealth (i.e. federal), the state and the local government all have 
substantive powers to govern and regulate the environment (Papadakis and Grant 2003, 30). 
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Nevertheless, since the rise of environmental concerns in Australia since the 1970s, there has 
been a shift of power towards the Commonwealth level due to the rise of domestic interest 
groups and popular interest and due to global agreements (Parliament of Australia 2012, 
chapter two). The 1970s saw the creation of several core environmental institutions as well as 
core legislation, such as the Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974. 
Without a direct constitutional head of power, these acts tended to occur on an ad hoc basis 
and relied more indirectly on a range of constitutional heads of power e.g. power over trade 
and commerce and international treaties policy (Interview, national civil servant, 2012, 
2013).  
In a manner similar to the EU supremacy rule, state legislation that is not consistent 
with Commonwealth law is invalid, subject to override (Petchey 2007: 18-19). The states 
have been active in this constitutional process, challenging Commonwealth legislation with 
consequent court decisions defining the scope of the Commonwealth’s role. The judicial 
interpretation has allowed the Commonwealth to operate in an expansive fashion (Parliament 
of Australia 2012, chapter two).  We see a pendulum swing in the balance between 
Commonwealth centralisation and decentralisation of the states (Interview, Australian legal 
expert, 17.9.13).  In the 1990s there was some Commonwealth centralisation power 
concerning the environment, but in the last 15 years there have also been tendencies towards 
devolution to the states, something likely to continue with the Abbott government in place. In 
2014 the national/Commonwealth level shares responsibility with the states for key areas 
such as water, air and ecosystem management, particularly the Environmental Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act (Petchey 2007: 23-24).  Local government retains a strong 
role in land use planning and waste management.  
Papadakis and Grant (2003: 30-31) argued that the Australian environmental policy 
approach is generally less consensus-based and proactive than one would expect in Northern 
Europe. Furthermore, there has been a considerable alteration in its tendencies over time. 
Arguably in the period of the 1980s, and particularly under the Labour government of that 
decade, the national government had adopted a fairly consensual style and proactive style 
towards the environment. Since 1992 this has significantly shifted as greater concerns about 
economic health and reductions in public finance took hold. Much of the Commonwealth 
intervention has been rather ad hoc in its approach to environmental protection, which raised 
questions about the consistency of policy and the relations between the central and more local 
political levels.  
One of the most vital institutional developments has been the creation of a layered 
process of ministerial councils (Interview, Commonwealth civil servant, 6.8.13; Gates 2007). 
The greater concern about the economic impact of state regulation led to the creation of the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) as a key arena for ensuring inter-governmental 
co-operation between the Commonwealth and state levels. As a ‘political compact’ rather 
than a legal document, there is ambiguity in the roles and in how to implement the co-
operative processes (Parliament of Australia 2012, chapter two).This move reflects a shift 
from a top-down structure to a more complicated multi-level governance (Godden et al. 
2013: 233-234).  These cooperative arrangements have helped create the coordination and 
information sharing that has allowed some instrument initiatives to occur. As the 
Commonwealth has moved into environmental policy-making, it has given the states a role in 
defining national standards and reinforced the reality that the states implement those 
standards (Kelemen 2004:117). 
 
Frames 
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In the 1970s, environmental policy was framed by the governmental elite as a serious 
problem, but one that could be addressed by existing bureaucratic approaches (Papadakis and 
Grant 2003: 32-33).  This frame however faces the overarching national narrative of 
extraction of resource from the land which remains. Greater federal intervention to protect the 
environment coincided with the creation of more comprehensive and proactive policy 
responses in line with the policy style mentioned in the previous section. However, the 1980s 
also saw a graduate shift to the idea of empowering businesses to deal with market failures 
and to incentivize businesses to create their own solutions.  This reorientation to the role of 
business actors was underpinned by a shift in policy priorities towards sustainable 
development, with the idea that economic development and environmental protection could 
be potentially compatible (Papadakis and Grant 2003: 32-33).   
 
Goals 
The 1970s Australian governments tended to address environmental policy priorities using 
the traditional command and control interventions in specific media. Accordingly, during the 
1974-1982 period, the Commonwealth created the Environment Protection Act 1974, the 
1975 Australian Heritage Commission and National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 
1975, and nature conservation with trade and transboundary implications. The legislation 
tended to focus on building institutions as well as administrative processes and 
responsibilities (Parliament of Australia 2012, chapter two). Although regulation has 
continued to be the dominant instrument, there has been a shift in focus. First the nature of 
the regulation has altered by the 1990s.  The change in the policy frame (i.e. seeking to limit 
government intervention and empower business while at the same time reflecting more 
adverse political conditions and financial constraints) led policy-makers to design regulation 
to be more flexible (Papadakis and Grant 2003: 33-34).  
Furthermore, there was a move to supplement new regulations with other types of 
instruments, including voluntary agreements, subsidies, taxes, and market instruments 
defining policy rights. This governance shift was institutionalised in the National Action Plan 
for Salinity and Water Quality National MBI Pilots Program MBI Pilot Programs which ran 
from 2003 to 2008.   The intent of this programme was to increase the national capacity to 
use MBIs by national, state and territorial support; states were heavily involved in the 
initiative (BDA Group 2009).  Perhaps the most important overarching programme in terms 
defining Australian governance has been the massive orientation towards funding the states in 
the 2000-2014 period.  Interviews differ about whether this represents a decentralisation 
tendency, or whether states have lost some of their focus on individual policy scope in light 
of the importance attached to these national funds (Interview Victoria civil servants, 11.9.13, 
3.7.13; Gates 2007: 137). 
 
Instruments 
Australia presents a mixed picture over time with respect to market-based instruments, but 
with some dramatic developments in the 2010-2012 period. It remains the case that 
regulations are the dominant instrument although there has been a shift to more regulatory 
frameworks (Interview, academic expert, 17.9.13).  The resulting mix tends to be one 
containing traditional statutory provision with other more self-regulatory measures. 
  The 2007 OECD review notes that the overall revenue from environmentally related 
taxes had decreased and was below the OECD mean by 2007. This picture is complicated by 
the fact that there are a scattering of taxes at the state (a waste levy in three states, an 
environmental contribution levy in Victoria) and federal level (aircraft noise, oil recycling 
and synthetic greenhouse gas levies) (OECD 2007: 161).  This general picture changed 
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somewhat as the Gillard Labour government managed to push through parliament an energy 
bill including a carbon tax (Interview, Commonwealth civil servants, 5.8.2013). However, the 
Abbott Coalition government saw its 2013 election as a mandate to scrap this system, citing 
its damage to the Australia economy and consumers (The Parliament of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2014).  What will replace it is less certain. The White Paper suggests an 
‘incentive-based approach that directly purchase emissions reductions and rewards practical 
and positive action’- i.e. giving positive incentives to business and farmers to install 
renewable energy infrastructure (Australian Government 2014: 21). However, the plan of the 
Coalition government to hike fuel excises has also been labelled as a carbon tax (Bourke 
2014).   
Some of the instrumental innovations have been longer term. These include incentive 
arrangements, such as the load-based license fee operating in New South Wales and Victoria, 
(which uses a mix of voluntary agreements) and license systems that have market and 
regulatory incentives. Voluntary agreements and partnership approaches have played a 
significant part in national resource as well as pollution management.  However, many critics 
raise telling questions about the actual impact of such programmes (OECD 2007). The 
COAG structure has generated a great deal of the impetus for the market instruments, as seen 
in the innovative  Murray-Darling, National Action Plan on Salinity and Water quality, and 
so forth (Interview, Commonwealth civil servants, 6.8.2013). 
 
Canada 
Structures 
Canada’s constitutional structure shares the power of legislation between the federal and 
provincial levels (Harrison 2000). The steering of environmental protection is divided 
between the federal and provincial governments in a way that is inherently ambiguous and 
therefore ripe for political tension.  This tension and complexity have resulted in periods of 
conflict and sometimes competition, as well as advances in environmental protection. From 
1970 until the present, the various national governments have experimented with mechanisms 
to enhance shared responsibility and co-ordination with a greater variety of civil society 
actors participating in formulating public policy (Skogstad 1996).  
Nevertheless, the dominant institutional reality is that provinces have dominated 
environmental protection, and the federal level has generally not tested the limits of its 
constitutional powers in this area.  This combined with the fact that the provinces have such 
strong constitutional prerogatives and control of the resources has led to a very limited 
Canadian federal role (Harrison 1996). Thus, the provinces have continued to have a strong 
role in implementation and enforcement. The federal government has taken a greater 
environmental policy profile, with the backing of Supreme Court decisions, but, like 
Australia, has decided to avoid provincial resistance by involving the provinces in the policy 
design process (Kelemen 2004). Intergovernmental fora, most notably the Canadian Council 
of Ministers of the Environment, have enabled this (Benidickson 2013). 
 In the 1970s, the Canadian policy approach tended to be a more exclusive process that 
involved the regulators and industry. Other societal groups were largely excluded in a manner 
that harkens back to the UK political system (Skogstad 1996). In the last 20 years, there has 
been a conscious effort to build consultative mechanisms and require public participation. 
Nevertheless, organized interest groups have tended to exploit these processes more than the 
general public or social movements.  The ongoing policy-making tensions between federal 
and provincial governments has given substantial scope to consultation between levels of 
government although some provinces take initiatives with minimal input from other 
provincial or the federal governments (Harrison 2000; Valiante 2007: 85-86).  
9 
 
 
Frames 
The traditional Canadian policy frame has gradually evolved from a belief in unrestricted 
usage of the vast natural resources of Canada to one of resource management.  Nevertheless, 
the dominant policy frame has remained one of grounding the concerns of resource 
management in the context of promoting economic growth and prosperity (Hessing et al. 
2005).  Other societal groups, notably indigenous peoples and environmental groups, have 
sought to insert other perspectives and world views. This has led to a broader concept of 
environmental stewardship - but without a pervasive rejection of economic concerns and 
priorities.  
 
Goals 
Over the course of Canada’s policy history, the policy strategy has focused on regulation and 
this remains the case in the 2014 Conservative government (Interview, Senior Policy 
Advisor, 5.6.14; Benidickson 2013).  However, one must be careful of describing this process 
as ‘command and control’. Similar arguments are made about how UK environmental policy 
works. Following on from the Canadian policy strategy, there was a very significant input 
from the regulated in terms of the development, enforcement and implementation of these 
regulations. This reflected a strongly consultative process between the regulators and the 
regulated (Hessing et al. 2005). Further scope and variability arose out of the fact that it was 
often the provinces deploying many of these instruments to achieve policy goals. Over time 
the national government has moved to supplement the regulatory framework with market-
based instruments (MBIs), non-regulatory agreements and informational tools.  
A second significant change in strategy came with the gradual move towards greater 
decentralization of environmental administration (Howlett 2000). The greatest investment in 
market-based instruments has been by the provinces, rather than the federal government, with 
climate change innovations seen for instance in British Columbia and its carbon tax. 
Nevertheless, the most influential imperative for innovation has been the United States 
market and the need both to cooperate with the United States as well as adapt to its state 
standards and state-led emissions trading schemes. Indeed, the Canadian federal government 
under Harper explicitly tied itself in 2010 to US targets and pace (Winfield and Macdonald 
2012). 
 
Instruments 
Starting from 2003, the Canadian federal government instituted a ‘smart regulation’ 
strategy to improve policy implementation; this involved having a flexible toolbox 
appropriate to any particular context (Valiante 2007). In addition to the dominant role of 
regulation, the federal government has instituted fiscal incentives for renewable industry, 
biofuels and land conservation as well as more general subsides and funding for 
environmental objectives. Since the late 1990s, there has been an industrial push to get 
greater prominence for voluntary agreements, with the Canadian federal government 
negotiating several specific agreements with particular industries as well as the creation  of 
‘voluntary challenges’ to target reduction of environmental degradation (Valiante, 2007: 93-
96). Increased emphasis has also been placed on pollution prevention information and eco-
labelling, through the ‘Environment Choice Scheme’. The federal government included other 
instruments in the national toolbox, including: voluntary agreements and ‘challenges’ 
targeting industry, fiscal incentives, subsidies and funding for environmental activities, 
informational/educational schemes and eco-labelling (Valiante 2007: 93-96).   
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The provincial level has contributed to the mix of different instruments. The 
provinces have used their more limited taxation powers to institute charges. There has been 
some experimentation with tradable permits in the provincial government and in bilateral 
talks with US state counterparts.  An example of the USA’s impact is the Canadian federal 
implementation of the Energy Star (a voluntary energy product standard) programme initiated 
at the US federal level (Interview, Federal civil servant, 14.4.14). 
 
Germany 
Structures 
Similar to the above federal systems, environmental competences are not distributed equally 
across the various sectors and issues (Wurzel et al. 2013). The federal level has the key role 
in the traditional media areas of air, waste and noise, but the German Länder have critical 
steering roles concerning water management and nature protection. Consequently, 
environmental approaches that seek to cross policy sectors and levels of government 
responsibility require complex negotiations (Wurzel 2002). 
 The traditional, corporatist depiction of the German policy system emphasizes 
extensive consensus building and consultation with societal actors (Wurzel et al. 2013). The 
policy-making approach is relatively legalistic and formalized, focused on making explicit 
statements of principle and minimising administrative discretion (Weale et al. 2000).  The 
input of various societal groups has been more variable as has the question of how 
activitist/reactive is the German policy steering.  In the early 1970s, it would be safe to 
characterise German governing as relatively activist but this depiction seems less accurate 
after reunification and the rise of a wide range of concerns about economic competitiveness 
(Wurzel 2002).  
 
Frames 
The core post-war German political frame has been one of maintaining a ‘social market 
economy’, which allows the state to define the conditions in which it interacts with and 
between societal actors (Wurzel 2002: 11). It was a natural progression for the mainstream 
parties in the 1970s and 1980s to argue for an ecological dimension to this core frame.  The 
frame holds that environmental protection is compatible with economic growth when the 
state provides strong regulatory incentives (such as requiring production facilities to make 
use of ‘best available technology’ or BAT) for economic actors to invest capital in ecology 
friendly technology, leading to green growth. Over time, Germany became one of the core 
arenas where the idea of ‘ecological modernisation’ developed (Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000). 
In the 1990s, this frame suffered a considerable challenge as the German state dealt with the 
enormous economic costs of reunification, the impact of the 1990s German recession and the 
debate about Germany’s competitiveness in the face of globalisation (Wurzel 2000; Weale et 
al. 2000). 
Underpinning the policy frame of strict regulation and encouragement to enhance 
environmental technological capacity, the Federal Environmental Programme of 1971 offered 
three core principles that fleshed out the policy behaviour norms (Wurzel et al. 2013). The 
first, the polluter pays principle, tries to place a greater onus on those bits of the economic 
sector that pollute. The second, the precautionary principle, requires active intervention by 
public actors to prevent pollution occurring even under conditions of policy uncertainty. 
Perhaps most interestingly, the co-operation principle, emphasised the importance of co-
ordination between government departments and different levels of government (Wurzel et 
al. 2013).  The inherent challenges posed by German federal structures and coalition 
governments have arguably limited such co-ordination. 
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Goals 
The German policy strategy and environmental goals have followed a strong activist principle 
and strongly stipulated command and control regulation since the 1970s (Hèritier et al. 1996). 
The German ecological modernisation frame and the precautionary principle have pushed 
regulatory ambition and traditional instruments (Weale et al. 2000). Certain other types of 
policy instrument have featured strongly in the German toolbox, particularly voluntary 
agreements and the first ‘Blue Angel’ eco-labelling scheme (Wurzel et al. 2013). Both reflect 
a consensus-focused relationship between the German state and business. Perhaps for this 
reason, some of the other potential instruments, such as taxes, have met with less enthusiasm. 
The EU context however has pushed Germany to adopt instruments that have not fitted with 
the traditional national approach to command and control and BAT and met German 
resistance: e.g. the eco audit and management system (EMAS) (Hèritier et al. 1996). 
 
Instruments 
In the early 1970s, the German system focused its means on regulations, often ones with 
quite ambitious targets, to target specific media-based issues (Wurzel et al. 2003). With 
reunification and the consequent economic changes, the German national government moved 
more towards seeking EU solutions. Nevertheless, regulations continued to accumulate in 
part because of the EU’s own generation process. Scholars estimate that German regulations 
had reached roughly 35,000 by the mid-1990s, but this number over-represents the various 
ordinances that all the different Länder generate (Wurzel et al. 2013). These regulations have 
tended to stipulate ambitious limits in line with the BAT and precautionary principles. The 
precautionary and co-operation principles helped the German government to justify more 
flexible policy instruments such as VAs and eco-taxes.  Germany has been a global leader 
and pioneer in the adoption of a national eco-label, and its companies have been at the 
forefront of adopting EMAS.  Nevertheless, the overarching dominance of regulations 
remains. 
 
The Netherlands 
Structures 
There are several dynamics in the Dutch political structure. First, there is a strong tendency 
for a segmentation of power within the state structure. The electoral system rewards small 
parties, leading to coalition governments. The system spreads responsibilities and power 
across several government layers: central, provincial and municipal (Eberg 1997).  Finally, 
the state’s organizational structure is segmented. Environmental powers are spread across 
different organisations and ministries, placing a premium on co-ordination efforts and 
processes (van Waarden 1995: 341; Van Tatenhove 1993: 20-1, 33).  
The Dutch national system has placed a historical priority in inclusive governing and 
consensus building to deal with historical sectarian divisions and environmental challenges 
(Van Waarden 1995: 335-347).  The Dutch tradition is to incorporate private sector 
organizations and objectives to help achieve public goals: this approach emphasises the need 
for consultation and co-operation with a wide range of different societal groups in order to 
build a consensus. At the heart of this effort has been the development of comprehensive 
national plans which also sought to maintain a consensus-based approach by including 
various groups in the strategic planning (Hanf and van de Gronden 1998). Into the new 
millennium, this approach has changed: the government coalitions tended to be concerned 
about the burden of ambitious environmental targets (preferring international or EU level 
solutions that maintained a ‘level playing field’) as well as acknowledging the difficulty of 
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implementing some of the past ambitious targets (Liefferink and Birkel 2010; Liefferink and 
Wiering 2007).  
 
Frames 
From the 1970s to the 1980s, Dutch national policy was strongly oriented towards substantial 
policy interventions by the government to protect the environment. A coalition of Christian 
Democrats and Liberals (VVD) that came into power in 1982 challenged this framing. The 
coalition orientation towards the environment reflected a desire to lessen the responsibility of 
government by involving societal actors as well as improving efficiency in the face of 
increasing numbers of studies questioning the implementation of the 1970s instruments 
(Bressers 1990; Zito et al. 2003). Accordingly the government developed a philosophy of 
regulatory streamlining with a focus on ‘internalisation’ (Hanf 1989). Internalisation focuses 
on the principle of co-ordination between the Dutch national ministries which bring together 
their own societal constituencies (van Tatenhove 1993: 47). Scholars have suggested that the 
Dutch internalisation movement is symptomatic of the wider ecological modernisation and 
sustainable development frames.  In line with both frames, the internalisation approach 
suggested that both the state and the market need to reflect ecological priorities, but in doing 
so harness market efficiencies (Liefferink 1997, 1998; Enevoldsen 2000). 
 
Goals 
The Netherlands fits somewhere between the law-based, standards-oriented approach of 
Germany and the more discretionary Canadian approach towards policy goals and 
instruments (Liefferink and van der Zouwen 2004). In terms of types of instruments, the 
Dutch adopted a command-and-control approach in the 1970s, emphasizing framework 
legislation and licensing. This led to some centralization through national regulation in order 
to confront the new environmental concerns and implementation issues. This continues to be 
a core aspect of Dutch environmental policy, reinforced by the EU.  Since the 1980s, newer 
environmental policy instruments have gained in importance but tended to supplement and 
extend traditional instruments (Wurzel et al. 2013).  
Part of the focus on goals is the incorporation of societal actors. With the movement 
towards the internalization policy, we see the development of the target groups concept: an 
explicit categorisation of both individuals and organisations within civil society that share 
characteristics and connections to a particular policy area. The target group idea emphasises 
that these similar actors are the focus of the policy instruments – i.e. they are the target of the 
instrument which is seeking to change behaviour (Eurofound 2010).  
 
Instruments 
Various overviews of Dutch policy continue to assess traditional regulation as being core 
(OECD 2003c; Liefferink and Wiering 2007). As in Germany, the EU has become an 
important reason for the continued reliance on traditional regulation and constraints on 
instrumental innovation; for example, efforts to implement EU legislation through a more 
flexible or voluntary scheme have met a very negative reaction from the Commission and the 
European Court of Justice (Smith and Ingram 2002: 593). 
 Nevertheless, the Dutch policy elite have over time recalibrated the nature of 
regulation, shifting from the top-down command-and-control control character of the early 
Dutch environmental legislation towards a set of more flexible and cost-effective 
environmental regulations which were drawn up by the government only after extensive 
stakeholder consultations. Since the 1990s the Dutch government has focused on simplifying 
the licensing process in Dutch environmental policy, particularly by targeting the significant 
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polluters and establishing general regulations (with standard procedures) for most of the other 
polluters (Wurzel et al. 2013; VROM 2005). The Dutch have also developed ‘Framework 
licenses’ that specify only general targets and give polluters the flexibility to meet the targets 
(Liefferink and Wiering 2007).  
The Dutch have made use of a significant number of other instruments. The shift of 
policy frames towards internalization and target groups in the 1980s saw the Dutch give a 
substantial role to negotiated voluntary agreements, or covenants. The design of the 
agreements evolved from fairly loose agreements to covenants targeted at particular sectors 
and linked to regulation and the licensing system (Zito et al. 2003). The agreements between 
the relevant ministries and both the public and private actors take on a binding nature after 
signing. The Netherlands has also taken a substantial lead in using taxation and, to a lesser 
extent, emissions trading schemes. The Dutch effort at emissions trading was overtaken by 
the EU process, but the Dutch successfully implemented national plans to extend their carbon 
dioxide market institutional mechanisms to include nitrogen emissions. Environmental 
charges were the first taxation focus, taking a prominent although secondary role in the Dutch 
system. From 1989 to 2000, the Dutch government turned increasingly to tax mechanisms to 
provide substantial revenue and provide an efficient set of tools to motivate actors, 
particularly the energy taxes. In 2008, the coalition of Christian Democrats and Labor pushed 
one last burst of taxation innovation creating a packaging tax and air passenger tax. However 
the rise of domestic economic problems and a rightist coalition has changed the momentum 
and led to the abolition of certain environmental taxes (Wurzel et al. 2013). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper first summarises the basic trends found in the four countries (filling out Table 2 
below) before making some comparative analytical conclusions about the governance 
propositions. Taking the countries in order, Australia has seen some distinctive 
transformations over time.  As a federal system, it has an inherent multi-level governing 
dynamic that spreads power; nevertheless, over time the Commonwealth has used 
international agreements and other avenues to centralise some policy authority with respect to 
the other levels of government but this remains fairly limited and subject to reverse swings. 
In terms of state-society relations, environmental policy has seen a wider range of actors and 
engagement since the 1980s but Australia arguably remains less orientated towards 
consensus-building and inclusion than the EU member states. The environmental policy 
frame has likewise evolved from a largely bureaucratic, hierarchical focus towards one that 
sought to bring businesses and market dynamics into the governing equation where individual 
actors have to face greater responsibility (Godden et al. 2013).  The picture of the policy 
goals is one of hybridity, but with regulations continuing to dominate. ‘New’ environmental 
policy instruments (NEPIs) have a more supplemental role and even the 2012 expansion of 
MBIs to address climate change operate in a highly charged political atmosphere and are 
vulnerable to roll back. 
 As was the case with Australia, the Canadian system of federalism has inherent multi- 
level dynamics that accentuate the ambiguous relations between the various levels. 
Nevertheless, the Canadian structure lacks some of the centralising instruments found in 
Australia.  The state-society relationship was originally rather exclusive but over time the 
political elite have built mechanisms to engage a wider section of voices; nevertheless, the 
privileged position of business, as articulated by Lindblom, remains.  The overarching policy 
frame reflects a move towards sustainability and away from a simple focus on resource 
exploitation; nevertheless, the balance in the dominant policy frame remains orientated 
toward economic concerns in line with the institutional structure. Canada maintains a focus 
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on regulation, but one that involves intensive consultation with the regulated and a core role 
of provinces in enforcement. Some significant NEPIs do exist, particularly at a provincial 
level, focused on engaging other actors in a largely voluntary and non-compulsive basis. 
 Up until reunification, the German system witnessed a fairly active national 
government enacting command and control regulation. At the same time, however, the 
German states have maintained strong inclusive elements of environmental governing. As is 
the case with The Netherlands, the institutional structure relies on a heavily formalised 
interaction with societal actors; this has not changed although the rise of environmental issues 
created more voices that required engagement. The essential ecological modernisation frame 
inherently recognises the importance of engaging business actors in the linked priorities of 
the environment and the economy.  The governing goals that pursued this frame have 
involved a focus on regulation with strict and often ambitious limits and technological 
demands. Nevertheless, it is discernible that the Europeanization of German environmental 
policy has seen an evolution in the nature of the command-and-control policies, with NEPIs 
playing a substantial but still secondary role. 
 The Dutch political system, although unitary, has its own institutional dynamics 
between levels, in addition to a fragmented executive requiring cross-party and cross-ministry 
co-ordination.  The process of including different societal elements is ingrained into the 
system.  The policy frame that developed over time, internalisation, emphasises the essential 
role of target groups in being involved in the policy process.  As was the case with Germany, 
the EU has reinforced the importance of regulations in the Dutch system.  Nevertheless, the 
specification of regulatory instruments has evolved over time in a more flexible direction, and 
it is arguable that the Dutch have seen the greatest shift towards NEPIs. Nevertheless, even 
covenants, which are negotiated voluntarily between the respective policy actors, become 
binding and are linked to the law.  NEPIs have not supplanted/displaced regulation; rather 
there is a considerable degree of instrument integration. 
  
Table 2. Comparative multivariate conclusions 
Country Governing 
Structures 
Governing 
Frames 
Governing Goals Governing 
Instruments 
Australia Multi-level 
federal, limited 
centralising, 
less inclusive, 
intergovern-
mental coord-
ination 
Moderate shift to 
involve 
businesses more 
in a sustainable 
approach 
Regulation 
focused, with 
supplementary 
NEPIs  
Regulation is 
evolving; MBIs 
have had some 
noteworthy 
appearances 
Canada Multi-level but 
with more 
limited federal 
scope, system 
remains less 
inclusive 
Fairly traditional 
focus on 
sustainable 
economic 
concerns but 
with other voices 
Regulation 
focused, with 
supplementary 
NEPIs 
‘Smart regulation’ 
that was always 
negotiated, 
supplemented 
with persuasive 
NEPIs and 
provincial MBIs 
Germany Multi-level 
federal but 
activist 
national 
government; a 
Ecological 
modernisation, 
backed by BAT 
and precaution 
Command and 
control 
regulation, with 
supplementary 
NEPIs 
Less stipulation as 
regulations evolve 
and newer 
instruments enter 
the picture 
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highly 
inclusive 
process 
The 
Netherlands 
Segmented and 
inclusive 
unitary state 
Internalisation 
(ecological 
modernisation 
and sustainable 
development) 
Strong policy 
mix, regulations 
and societal 
inclusion 
foremost 
More flexible 
regulation, with 
strong support of 
MBIs and 
covenants 
 
In terms of making sense of the comparison in Table 2, the evidence of this paper 
suggests that government-governance hybridity exists across all four political systems to a 
lesser or greater degree.  In arguing this, I want to emphasise the merit of the multivariate 
approach of Table 2 for the study of governance and the question of hybridity. There is a real 
danger in governance studies of everything being labelled as a hybrid arrangement. 
Differentiating it by 4 different analytical categories as well as a continuum between 
government and governance starts to give the analyst some nuance.    
I now turn to the other governance hypotheses (whether the hybridity was a 
permanent or temporary feature, the degree of movement along the continuum for all four 
countries, and the uniformity of movement across countries). Based on the evolution of 
policy for all four countries, the evidence suggests that a government/governance mix is the 
permanent reality rather than a temporary phase before the governance dynamics become 
more dominant.  Governance dynamics have entered all four levels of analysis (although only 
in a minor way in the framing dimension), but not in a way that supplants or for that matter 
significantly erodes the traditional governing.  The evidence suggests rather that the 
dynamics have often modified the nature of the policy process (particularly where it comes to 
the inclusion of a greater range of societal voices interested in environmental priorities) and 
the outcomes (often emphasising more flexibility and a greater role for societal actors).  
Comparing across the countries, the main change in the governing structures has been 
one where there is more emphasis on including wider cross sections of the population. In the 
case of Germany and the Netherlands where consensus building mechanisms are relatively 
elaborate and formal, this has been more a question of listening to the greater range of 
societal interests and movements created by national and EU environmental politics and 
policy. In contrast Australia and Canada have seen a greater voice given to ‘green’ actors but 
without such systematic inclusion. To the degree that this overview can generalise from one 
unitary state case, unitary systems do not seem to be on a separate trajectory.  The European 
Union’s role is mixed in terms of the structural dynamic: the EU environment has given 
greater scope to a wider set of actors but also has privileged executive government in the EU 
decision-making process.   
The policy framing in all four cases reflects a greater prioritisation of environmental 
priorities. But it is noteworthy that all four frames enshrine the importance of the market and 
engagement with market actors in pursuit of environmental objectives.  In the case of the 
Commonwealth states, it is difficult to argue that this ideational connection is a governance 
development. More emphatically, the German framing reinforces traditional social market 
economic thinking. Perhaps the Dutch framing reflects most a shift in understanding about 
how to steer and involve societal actors.  The Commonwealth countries, although the policy 
framing has embraced sustainability since 1970, still reveal a strong constitutional and 
historical legacy that favours states/provinces in a significant steering role reflecting a 
resource extraction prioritisation; there is more of a tendency to see the sustainability aim as 
being in tension with the economic competitiveness aim. Another significant trend is that the 
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economic realities of German reunification and the concerns about the competitiveness of the 
economy in the other three countries have seen a rather reactive approach to environment, 
even in the Netherlands in the last decade. 
Moving down the ladder to governing goals, the Dutch again come closest to having a 
governance mix but even here the traditional statist tool, regulation, remains primary. The EU 
has reinforced this tendency in the two member states, but the reality is the same for Australia 
and Canada.  In all four countries there is a policy mix with particular NEPIs often having a 
high political profile or significant policy impact. Nevertheless, the biggest evidence for a 
governance shift comes with the recalibration of instruments, in this case the regulatory 
instruments which are becoming more flexible and more participatory over time. Governance 
clearly is at work at this lowest level and it is significant. At the same time, however, the 
Commonwealth countries, especially Canada, have tended to take a more flexible approach to 
regulations even before the trends towards governance were even conceptualised. The reality 
that this is the traditional statist tool suggests the need for a nuanced understanding of 
government/governance dynamics.  In terms of instrument alternatives, the rise of the ETS 
creates its own set of institutional changes and alterations in the state-society interactions. 
Even without the changes to the governing structures that have been identified, this change is 
a substantial and significant one, but perhaps not one that transforms the elements of 
government into the governance ideal type. 
Having discussed the concepts across all four countries, all that remains is to examine 
the governing dimensions in relationship to each other. In terms of movement towards the 
governance pole, the governing frames (in terms of a greater inclusion of actors in terms of 
quality and quantity) and governing instruments suggest a stronger degree of governance 
movement than the other two dimensions.  The empirical evidence also suggests the 
continued constraints that the higher level policy elements (structural and policy frames) in 
the Hall model place on governance.  The reality of EU membership and the constitutional 
constraints in the federal countries have stamped the evolution of environmental governance 
in all four countries; however, the limited, reactive frames of the national governments in the 
four countries have been a very significant, recent trend across the four states. 
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